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ABSTRACT
Planetary surface operations have been studied since the last visit of humans to the Moon, 
including conducting analog missions. Mission Operations lessons from these activities are 
summarized. Characteristics of forecasted surface operations are compared to current human 
mission operations approaches. Considerations for future designs of mission operations are 
assessed.
INTRODUCTION
National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) efforts in human space flight are 
currently focused on the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs, with 
efforts beginning on the Constellation Program, in accordance with the President’s “Vision for 
Space Exploration” (Bush 2004). The lunar phase of the Constellation Program begins with lunar 
“sortie” missions that consist of up to seven days on the lunar surface. The “sortie” missions are 
followed by the establishment of a lunar outpost. 
Both the Space Shuttle and ISS programs are important to the development of a capability for 
human exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The ISS provides extensive research 
capabilities to determine how the human body reacts to long duration stays in space. Also, the 
ISS and Shuttle can serve as a limited testbed for equipment or entire systems that may be used 
on missions to the Moon, Mars, or to a near-Earth asteroid. 
It has been nearly 35 years since the Apollo astronauts visited the Moon. Future space explorers 
will have to re-learn how to work and live on planetary surfaces, and how to do that for extended 
periods of time. Since the Moon is less than five days away by spacecraft, the lunar surface has 
much to offer as a stepping stone to other solar system destinations. Not only can the Moon be 
used as a testbed for planetary surface operations and equipment, but renewed lunar exploration 
may help address the many scientific questions about the Moon and the Earth-Moon system that 
remain unanswered.
During missions to the lunar surface, exploration crews will perform a wide assortment of 
scientific tasks, including material sampling and emplacement of automated instruments. Lunar 
surface mission operations include the activities of the crew living and working on the Moon, 
mission support from the Earth, and the operation of robotic and other remotely commanded 
equipment on the surface and in lunar orbit.  Other surface activities will include the following: 
exploring areas surrounding a habitat; using rovers to collect rock and soil samples; setting up 
experiments on the surface to monitor the radiation environment and any seismic or thermal 
activity in the Moon’s interior; and conducting scientific analyses and experiments inside a 
habitat laboratory. Of course, the astronauts will also have to spend some of their surface time 
“doing chores” and maintaining their habitat and other systems. 
In preparation for the upcoming era of lunar exploration, NASA must design the answers to many 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20060013538 2019-08-29T21:42:13+00:00Z
operational questions. What will the astronauts do on the lunar surface? How will they 
accomplish this? What tools will they require for their tasks? How will robots and astronauts work 
together? What vehicle and system capabilities are required to support the activities? How will 
the crew and the Earth-based mission control team interact? During the upcoming initial phases 
of manned lunar exploration, one challenge in particular is virtually the same as during the 
Apollo program: How can scientific return be maximized during a relatively short lunar surface 
mission? 
Today, NASA is investigating solutions to these challenges by conducting analog missions. 
These Earth-based missions possess characteristics that are analogous to missions on the Moon 
or Mars.  These missions are excellent for testing operational concepts, and the design, 
configuration, and functionality of spacesuits, robots, rovers, and habitats. Analog mission crews 
test specific techniques and procedures for surface field geology, biological sample collection, 
and planetary protection.  The process of actually working an analog mission reveals a myriad of 
small details, which either contribute to or impede efficient operations, many of which would 
never have been thought about otherwise. It also helps to define the suite of tools, containers, 
and other small equipment that surface explorers will use. 
This paper focuses on the lunar surface portion of a lunar “sortie” mission, meaning that there is 
no pre-established lunar base to incorporate into operations. The paper describes typical lunar 
surface operations, presents various operational considerations, and discusses how analog 
missions have addressed selected operational considerations. Some of the applicable lessons 
learned from the Shuttle, ISS, and Apollo programs, as well as analog missions, are presented.
SURFACE OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS AND CHALLENGES
Introduction
Lunar sortie missions will consist of a week or less of intensive surface EVA operations with the 
crew living and working out of the LSAM. Each sortie mission will be a rigorous  test of the 
vehicles, EVA suits and equipment, and operational techniques. The desire to maximize the 
science return will intensify the pace of activity. 
Vehicle capabilities are critical for maximizing scientific return. The needs of the scientific 
community should be represented during the design phase of the spacecraft and other 
equipment. For its part, the shuttle was designed with such a good payload support system 
(including mechanical, electrical, thermal, command, and telemetry interfaces) that almost no 
modifications have been required over more than 25 years of operations. The shuttle was also a 
fairly flexible vehicle allowing for the likelihood of mission success and optimization.
During the Apollo Program, there was a steady increase in scientific return per mission due to 
improved equipment, training, and mission operations. As political success (a single manned 
landing and return) became more likely, a process began in which spacecraft, space suits, and 
other equipment were improved or developed with science return as a goal. The most prominent 
examples of this are the J-Series Lunar Module (LM), the Scientific Instrument Module (SIM) bay 
of the Service Module (SM), the EV-A-7LB spacesuit, and the Lunar Roving Vehicle (LRV) 
(“rover”).
These equipment changes were made because scientific return was not just a matter of returning 
a larger mass of lunar samples from the area immediately surrounding the LM. The strategy, 
rather, was focused on two areas. First, a greater variety, and not just mass, of carefully 
documented samples were to be collected from the landing site. This, in turn, naturally leads to 
longer EVAs, more EVAs, and greater surface mobility. Those requirements naturally lead, in 
turn, to an LM capable of longer duration surface stays, a rover, and an improved space suit. 
The second strategy was to use the orbiting Command Module (CM) as a platform for examining 
the lunar surface at large scale. This resulted in the development of the SIM bay in the SM and 
the use of surface exploration to provide a ground truth calibration for the orbiting instruments 
(Worden, 2000). 
Scientific community input had to be considered as part of these development programs. The 
lunar rover was a tremendously important tool for increasing scientific return on the later Apollo 
missions.  The rover was preferred by the scientific community and it proved to be far more 
useful for exploration due to its ability to carry two people, which surface sampling work generally 
required, and a large quantity of equipment.  Consider, as a simple measure of the rover’s 
importance, that the Apollo 17 rover was driven for 22.3 miles while the Apollo 14 crew, on foot, 
ventured less than a mile away from the LM. The rover stretched consumables because the crew 
could ride rather than walk, provided accurate navigation, facilitated stowage for tools, samples, 
and science equipment, and supported a ground-controlled TV camera that was vital for the 
ability of the ground science team to support the crew.
Lessons learned during early missions may result in many improvements to equipment design, 
exploration methods, and habitat configuration for later missions. Changes in vehicle hardware, 
software, or crew interfaces ripple through to changes in simulators and additional crew and 
mission control center personnel training. This has occurred in the Space Shuttle and ISS 
programs.
During interviews on future exploration planning, Apollo crewmembers have stated that future 
lunar mission design philosophy should include the complete system, achieving a seamless 
integration of the crew into the facilities and the equipment, with the equipment designed to fit 
the tasks that the crew is assigned, rather than the opposite. Apollo astronauts also emphasized 
that simplicity and reliability were important, with routine tasks and simple emergencies driving 
equipment design and, not worst-case scenarios (Connors 1993).
The optimization of lunar surface operations is a function of many factors, including the 
following:
The design of the LSAM spacecraft·
The design of the lunar rover, spacesuit, and portable equipment·
The training of science teams, flight controllers, and crews·
The techniques of lunar surface operations·
The selection of landing sites·
Design, selection, spacecraft integration, and training for experiment hardware·
Flight planning·
Flight rules, mission priorities, procedures, and other flight products·
Multi-mission integration·
Lunar sample transport and curation·
Interaction between the crew, flight control team, mission science team, and greater ·
scientific community
Lunar surface mission operations include the activities of the crew living and working on the 
Moon, mission support from the Earth, and the operation of robotic and other remotely 
commanded equipment on the surface and in lunar orbit. Mission operations teams participate in 
mission architecture development, vehicle definition, mission planning, training, and real-time 
operations.  The prime lunar mission objectives are lunar science, exploration, operational 
preparation, and technology testing for future missions to Mars.
The major goals for lunar sortie missions are:
Scientific investigations to further understand lunar geologic development and to map ·
lunar resources
Sample collection and documentation of samples and sampling siteso
Crew observation of surface featureso
Retire risk associated with establishing a long-duration lunar base and martian ·
exploration
By obtaining operational experience with equipment (landers, rovers, space o
suits, experiments) and flight techniques (precision landing)
Prototyping in-situ resource extraction and utilization (oxygen extraction, solar o
cell fabrication, etc) [not discussed in detail for this paper]
Maximize Crew Effectiveness·
Design systems to minimize crew involvement with routine tasks so as to o
maximize their ability to observe, think, and sample (Apollo crews spent large 
amounts of time reading film magazine frame counts, voicing out rover system 
status, and taking pictures)
Surface Activity Planning (prior to crew arrival on surface)
To prepare for human missions, robotic orbiters and surface robots will study the lunar 
geography.  The purpose of these robotic elements is to locate resources, identify scientifically 
interesting sites, characterize potential landing areas, create accurate lunar databases, and test 
technologies required for human landings and surface operations.  The data from these 
unmanned missions will influence into subsequent mission architecture, vehicle design, and 
mission planning decisions.
Pre-mission planning will target specific locations for exploration but the real-time operations 
must allow flexibility for responding to unexpected discoveries.
Surface Activity Planning (after crew arrival on planetary surface)
During Apollo, all EVA operations were completely planned out minute by minute and there was 
little time for deviation from the plan.  If a geologically interesting site was discovered real-time 
by the Apollo crew, they were allowed an extremely limited amount of time to explore it, about 20 
minutes. Apollo astronauts felt that they had been too rigidly scheduled during their missions and 
that this should change for the future (Connors 1994). One of their suggestions was that there 
should be a daily planning meeting held between the crew, operations personnel, and science 
personnel to plot out the next day’s activities based on previous results (Connors 1993). Results 
from previous missions and previous moonwalks will be discussed during the planning meeting 
in order to formulate the best plan possible for the next EVA. Crewmembers and the science 
team will be able to modify the EVA plan in response to operational circumstances and data 
acquired during the mission. EVAs should be planned in such a way that they are flexible enough 
to respond to anomalies, or to opportunities that arise from new discoveries. When the crew 
arrives at a geology stop, the science team will have just a few minutes to listen to the crew’s 
description of the site, watch the downlink video, and decide if the tasks and priorities assigned 
pre-mission are still appropriate. Vehicle and EVA systems information from the flight control 
team will be integrated into the EVA plan.
This is a different concept from how operations are currently planned today for Space Shuttle 
and ISS, where the EVAs are planned out explicitly pre-flight and there is little modification to the 
plan real-time unless an off-nominal/contingency situation arises. Finally, it is the nature of 
exploration that the crew and science teams will generally not know exactly what to expect at the 
detailed level before they arrive on the surface. This is a substantially different way of operating 
than a typical space shuttle or space station EVA in which the location and exact configuration of 
every task and piece of hardware is known in advance.
In order for the ground science team to be effective in the EVA planning process, certain 
elements need to be implemented in order to maximize effectiveness of the team. The following 
are some of these operational elements…
planning, training, and simulations will integrate the science community and flight control §
personnel
design systems to allow ground science team members to feel as close as possible to §
being on the surface with the crew
many video cameras (rover, helmet, microscope) with multiple feeds of real-time video§
ground controlled high-resolution digital camera with real-time downlink of images§
EVA duration affects what tasks are placed on the activity plan. Short duration EVAs are about 4 
hours in length and only local tasks (approximately 1-3 km walk/5-10 km rover) are possible. 
Long duration EVAs, lasting 6 to 8 hours, are needed when long traverses (approximately 10-
15km) across the surface are planned. When asked about EVA duration, Apollo crewmembers 
felt that EVAs lasting seven to eight hours every other day were acceptable, and most of them 
felt that conducting them every day was the way to operate, but that it depended on the crew’s 
autonomy (Connors 1993). It is important to give the crew the time necessary to document and 
investigate an exploration site that is discovered real-time during a surface EVA. However, 
based on Apollo experience, a geology stop may be as short as 10 minutes and is rarely longer 
than an hour. Geology stops often cannot be extended under any circumstances due to the 
decreasing radius of the walk-back limit. In addition, the crew will receive adequate information 
on consumable levels, metabolic rates, and overall time remaining in order to determine how 
much time they have available to change or add a task.
The design of the EVA plan and the LSAM vehicle are also influenced by the number of 
crewmembers that will perform a moonwalk at the same time and the timing of the EVAs in the 
lunar cycle. During interviews, the Apollo crewmembers stated that they thought a two person 
crew should be the basic unit although they thought that contingency EVAs performed by a 
single person were reasonable. In fact, an EVA every other day might be too few (Connors 
1993). With that in mind there are various options of how EVAs can be performed with 4 
crewmembers on the surface. The options include having two separate 2-man EVA teams 
(working different traverses), or a 4-man team on a single traverse, or having two 2-man teams 
in which one does a traverse (with rover) and one stays near the LSAM doing things like 
experiment setup and localized sampling. For a timeline that includes 7 days of EVAs, the work 
can be distributed among two 2-man teams as laid out in Table 1. Doing an EVA every day for 
seven days is maybe too hard and every other day gives too little return. Maybe this implies a 
schedule in which any team does a max of two back-to-back days leading to something like:
Table 1: Proposed EVA Schedule for Two 2-man Teams 
Day EVA Team 1 EVA Team 2
1 EVA EVA
2 EVA IVA
3 IVA EVA
4 EVA EVA
5 EVA IVA
6 IVA EVA
7 EVA EVA
A proposed schedule like this should ultimately be verified via early simulated missions.
The timing of the EVAs relative to the lunar cycle can add more constraints to an EVA plan. 
EVAs will be more difficult to perform during lunar night and lunar noon because mobility, 
viewing, and EVA consumable usage will be affected during these periods. Therefore landing 
constraints may be implied in order to maximize surface EVA efficiency.
The specific tasks that are planned during the lunar sortie EVAs will focus on geologic discovery 
and investigating operational concepts for lunar outpost and Mars missions. In order for these 
tasks to be efficient in aiding future mission design, any mission objectives need to be integrated 
with mission constraints (spacecraft, crew, etc.) and science goals in order to achieve maximum 
results. One way to aid in ensuring that every lunar surface EVA achieves maximum results is to 
minimize the mechanical actions that the crewmembers have to take, such as extensive setup 
for experiments, frame counts on cameras, long descriptions of sites when MCC can receive 
downlinked video, reading out gauges for systems without downlinked telemetry, etc. Thus it is 
critical that the rover, equipment, spacesuits, and tools be designed to reduce as much as 
possible the overhead tasks of a lunar surface EVA. This is to allow as much time as possible for 
the crew to think about the geological context of a site and to select good samples. Video, 
telemetry, communication links, and data recorders need to be in place for the MCC to remove 
some of this burden from the crewmembers. This was a failing of the Apollo program in that 
excessive time was spent doing routine tasks such as verbally reading rover system status and 
camera film magazine frame counts to the ground.  
Some lunar surface operations should be dedicated to Mars simulations in which the crew 
performs most of their short term planning, and a significant communications time delay with the 
mission operations center is imposed, this is when data recorders should be utilized.
Geologic Science 
Science operations will be limited for sortie missions, but may include emplacing surface 
experiments, conducting area geological surveys, selecting, collecting, documenting, and 
classifying samples, and a small amount of in-the-field analysis. There will not be time during 
sortie missions for any extensive analysis and most geology stops will be a “one shot only”, so all 
tasks for that target location must be performed at that time. In addition, lunar sortie missions will 
be similar to Apollo in the fact that there is limited cargo mass and volume allocated for sample 
return. Different operational concepts might be tested where one or two crewmembers stay in the 
LSAM or habitat to sort out the best samples for return to Earth while two other crewmembers 
are out on an EVA.
Crews could collect lunar samples, perform limited analysis, deploy science packages, and 
explore the areas within a 10 km radius in unpressurized rovers.  These missions could take 
place on both the lunar near side and far side without establishing any long-term outposts
Storing samples for return to Earth can be problematic. During Apollo, problems occurred during 
sample retrieval and storage because of the rushed EVA timeline, and for the disjointed process 
for sample retrieval and storage. This sometimes caused problems (as on Apollo 14) with trying 
to correlate samples with geologic sites that had been visited.  
Prior to the lunar sortie missions, a documentation process for tracking samples and 
corresponding them to lunar locations must be fully established. Photos, sample bag numbers, 
sample description, lunar location description (to get the full context of a samples surroundings) 
and the lunar location are all pieces of information that need to be documented and correlated 
together in order to achieve the top scientific results. With advancements in photography, 
crewmembers will no longer report photo magazine numbers. Instead, the timetag on digital 
photos can be used to match them up with a particular lunar sampling site. This process can be 
thoroughly investigated during training and analog missions prior to lunar exploration.
EVA Suit Design
The planetary EVA suits must be designed to provide a level of comfort, and a range of motion 
that permit crewmembers to work a full duration EVA without excessive fatigue and consumables 
usage. The suits will be designed specifically for planetary EVAs with high mobility, durability, 
high frequency of use, and dust resistance.
The Apollo EVA suits have gained a reputation for being cumbersome and inflexible. There are 
numerous video footages of Apollo crewmembers tripping, losing their balance, or falling due to 
the fact that the Apollo suits were inflexible and the center of gravity was not placed at an 
operational optimal location. These situations often occurred when crewmembers tried to collect 
samples without a partner and the inflexibility of their suits prohibited them from being effective. 
Based on this experience, the Apollo crewmembers have made a number of suggestions for 
future planetary EVA suit design:
simplicity and reliability are the most important factors§
suit flexibility§
pull the suit closer to the body and to reduce the inertia associated with starting, §
stopping and changing direction
maintenance simplicity§
limit the amount of joints and bearings§
custom gloves (Connors 1993).§
These changes suggested by the Apollo crewmembers will increase the operational capabilities 
of the EVA suit and allow for greater mission success. By designing the suits with simplicity in 
mind, the maintenance of the suit will be minimal allowing for quicker turn around between 
moonwalk excursions and limit the amount of time for EVA prep (ingress suit and depress) and 
post EVA (egress suit and repress) operations. Pulling the suit closer to the body, situating the 
center of gravity at an optimal location, providing flexibility, and custom gloves will allow the 
crew to perform the surface activities more effectively which in turn increases the number and 
quality of sample return.
Along with the comfort that comes with each crewmember having custom gloves, this will also 
provide better control of tools. However due to the inherent nature of EVA suit gloves, gripping 
tools will probably still be a chore and tool design must take this into account. Tools for surface 
activities should be designed to eliminate the need for continuous gripping of tools so as to 
prevent problems.
EVA Airlock
The LSAM serves as the EVA staging area and crew habitat for lunar sortie missions.  As such, it 
requires more living and working area than it would if it were merely a crew cabin for ascent and 
landing. The LSAM will have an airlock for added safety and mission assurance, operation 
flexibility, and dust mitigation. 
An airlock on the LSAM will maximize operational flexibility and crew safety. This will allow some 
crewmembers to remain inside the LSAM in a shirt-sleeve environment during EVA operations.  
This also prevents a suit failure, or an ill crewmember that cannot suit up, from scrubbing the 
remainder of the surface mission. An additional benefit is EVA crew rotation to maximize total 
EVA time in a single crew day. An early team could egress and work for hours before the second 
team joins them. After working together, or at different locations, the early team could then 
ingress before the late team. The IVA team would not have to be suited.
Egress and ingress paths should be as unobstructed as possible to avoid damage to EVA suits or 
the LSAM. The LSAM also carries unpressurized rover(s), EVA tools and equipment, and 
science and technology testing gear to the surface. The rover and some of the equipment will be 
stowed externally and must be easily accessible to the suited EVA crew for safe deployment.
The airlock and suit maintenance area also serves as a “mud room” to keep lunar dust out of the 
living quarters. It may be designed so that dust is expelled during depressurization and external 
hatch opening. 
Dust Mitigation
During the Apollo missions, lunar dust was a major problem. It got into everything, jammed 
moving parts, and was extremely abrasive. Part of the crew’s time will be devoted to controlling 
lunar dust so that it does not pose a health hazard or degrade operational capability.  Testing the 
effectiveness of dust abatement methods applicable to longer missions should be an objective of 
sortie missions. The EVA airlock should contain multiple tactics to aid in dust mitigation.
It has not been determined how dust will be mitigated on lunar missions but some possible 
solutions are to use an adhesive-type and sticky substance dust remover on the EVA suits to 
employ mechanical brushes, and to use a powerful vacuum cleaner mechanism. Dust 
suppression methods, such as deployable mats, might be used to reduce the amount of dust 
scattered by EVA crews and vehicles. These mats would be most useful in the immediate vicinity 
of a lunar outpost. In addition, research is being conducted on the use of electrical current to 
repel dust. Much of the finer dust particles are magnetically charged, so a mild current running 
through electrical wires imbedded in the outer layer of the spacesuit, could be used to repel lunar 
dust throughout the EVA.
Dust mitigation is one of the least studied areas of lunar exploration, but it could pose the 
greatest risk to mission success. More time needs to be devoted to developing strategies for 
mitigating dust prior to returning to the Moon in order to improve chances for successful lunar 
exploration.
Unpressurized Rover Design and Operations
A means of surface mobility, such as lunar rovers, maximizes the payoff of EVA by greatly 
extending the range and scope of operations.  Crews can explore the area or get to and from 
work locations quickly, and with less consumables expenditure, than on foot.  Rovers can also 
carry tools, equipment, and consumables that would otherwise burden the EVA crew.  
Moonwalks become more efficient because the rover provides the crew with a brief “rest” period 
(resulting in less fatigue), extends consumables by lowering metabolic rates on the 
crewmembers, carries tools, and reduces suit exposure to dust/regolith (abrasion, 
contamination).  By utilizing the rover to supplement spacesuit consumables (power, cooling, 
oxygen), the crew’s efficiency during an EVA is maximized. 
During Apollo, the rovers used toward the end of the program were extremely beneficial in 
allowing the crew to cover more surface area and therefore perform more geologic mission 
objectives. However the capabilities of these rovers did not seem to match well with the terrain 
requirements which caused many operational constraints to be imposed on the crew operating 
the rover vehicle. For example, a more integration between terrain requirements and rover 
capabilities should occur in order to allow for maximized mission productivity.
Two unpressurized rovers would be optimum for sortie missions. This would allow two separate 
two-person teams to operate simultaneously with full mobility, and provides a backup vehicle if 
one breaks down. By placing the four crewmembers into buddy pairs with each pair on a rover, 
twice as much surface area can be covered during a single EVA. In addition, if only two 
crewmembers are performing an EVA, each rover can carry a single crewmember, thus allowing 
each rover to carry an additional 150 to 200 kg more gear (experiments, tools, consumables, 
etc.) to a worksite, or to carry samples back to the LSAM or habitat.
Robotic Elements
Robotic elements were not a part of Apollo EVAs. Many Apollo crewmembers have commented 
during interviews that teleoperation of robotic rovers should be integrated into the operations 
planning (Connors 1994).  If robotic elements are added to future lunar exploration flights, they 
will enable faster site surveys and data collection in teleoperated or autonomous modes, and 
enable technology testing and demonstration for robotics as future real-time EVA assistants. 
Robotic missions can also be used at surface locations to survey potential landing locations and 
characterize local surface environments to evaluate their potential for science and ISRU 
operations (AAS 2005).
There will not be any ISRU on the lunar surface for the initial lunar sortie missions. Once ISRU is 
added into the lunar exploration mission design, robots can be used to prepare an ISRU 
collection or processing site, deploy ISRU equipment, and maintain the equipment to some 
extent. They may collect and transport raw materials, and transfer products from the processing 
facility to storage tanks. Robotic rovers should also have the instrumentation and dexterous 
capabilities to perform general-purpose geological exploration such as, studing the depth and 
density of regolith, examining the chemical properties of rock and regolith, and microscopically 
determining regolith grain characteristics.
Planetary robotic orbiters can aid in providing detailed site mapping and altimetry which will be 
important at the Moon and Mars for site selection, outpost layout planning, and analysis of 
access routes to the surrounding areas.
Flight Controller Console Roles and Responsibilities
Currently, mission-specific program management provides program requirements to the 
operations community and sets priorities for each flight or mission. The MCC operations team 
provides the facilities and tools, training, and flight control personnel to plan and execute real-
time operations of the assigned mission per the Program’s requirements. Engineering teams 
provide the spacecraft design expertise to validate the operational plans and procedures fall 
within the limits and capabilities of the flight vehicle, especially in real-time in the presence of 
failures and/or degraded systems’ capability
During planetary surface missions, the mission operations team in the control center monitors 
LSAM systems telemetry, assists with anomaly resolution, uplinks data and commands to the 
LSAM, and conducts voice and video communications with the crew when necessary. Crew and 
vehicles are more autonomous, and must deal with time-critical decisions on their own. In this 
mode, the Earth-based mission operations and science teams serve a more long term planning, 
science and engineering support, and detailed analysis role. For missions to Mars, the finite 
speed of light will make true real-time interaction with the crew impossible. Lunar outpost 
missions will simulate this mode of operations. In order for ground personnel to effectively 
communicate, there will be a bridge (or liaison) between science and engineering communities, 
someone who speaks both “languages”.
During Apollo, the interaction between the flight control team and the science team was 
coordinated through a single personnel interface. The science team had a lead that integrated all 
of their inputs and objectives and worked with the liaison to ensure science objectives for the 
mission were achieved. The liaison brought operational and engineering expertise to the science 
team and represented the science community to MCC.
A person (or team) with credibility in both the operational and scientific communities needs to 
oversee the process of integrating scientific desires with limited operational capabilities. Science 
investigators are understandably narrowly focused on their specific experiment and are often 
unaware of the myriad limitations imposed by the manned spaceflight environment. Furthermore, 
they often need assistance to understand standardized operational procedures. When accepting 
operational limitations, the scientific investigator needs to know that the responsible parties 
understand his unique goals and problems and that within the context of limited resources he 
and his experiment are being treated fairly. For their part, the crew and spacecraft flight control 
team need to feel that the scientific team understands the relevant operational limitations. The 
key to achieving this credibility is to demonstrate visible technical competence in both spheres of 
operations. The primary goals for all involved are crew safety, vehicle integrity and mission 
success.
With this background, the role of the Lunar Surface Operations Officer in upcoming lunar 
exploration can be defined. In general terms, the Lunar Surface Operations Officer is the 
member of the spacecraft flight control team responsible for surface geology. In this role he 
represents the flight control team to the surface geology team and vice versa, so he is the 
interface between the surface geology team and the flight control team. The PI (Principal 
Investigator) for Surface Geology leads the surface geology team. The Lunar Surface Operations 
Officer and the PI coordinate to accomplish the scientific goals of the mission. At each EVA 
science worksite, the Lunar Surface Operations Officer works with the PI to confirm sampling 
priorities and coordinate tasks for ground-controlled equipment such as video cameras. The 
Lunar Surface Operations Officer team also manages the geology time-line and the time 
allocated for each worksite and coordinates this information with the EVA Officer who manages 
the overall EVA plan, manages the rover systems, and monitors the spacesuit systems and 
consumables. In addition, the Lunar Surface Operations Officer keeps track of the stowage 
locations for geology tools and samples.
The Lunar Surface Operations Officer coordinates with the Experiments Officer who is, in turn, 
responsible for physical scientific payload devices such as those which may be operated portably 
by the crew, set up on the lunar, or which are installed on the LSAM or CEV (Crew Exploration 
Vehicle) spacecraft.
The science team will probably be distributed among NASA center and universities, therefore the 
Lunar Surface Operations Officer must integrate amongst all parties to optimize the scientific 
activities and mission objectives without compromising other aspects of the mission (vehicle 
systems and crew safety).
ANALOG MISSIONS
Categories and Sites
 
Earth-based exploration analog missions possess characteristics that are analogous to missions 
on the Moon or Mars.  They provide a mission framework in which to exercise, evaluate, and 
refine operational concepts for human exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO).  They also 
provide opportunities to test procedures, technologies, and field science techniques being 
developed for exploration.  
The following are examples of what can be tested during analog missions:
Earth-based exploration analog mission simulations, with crewmembers living in a high §
fidelity habitat mockup, and doing EVA in pressurized planetary suits, can demonstrate 
the maintainability of lunar surface infrastructure, such as habitats and rovers. Lessons 
learned from such simulations should influence designs and operational techniques.  
Analog missions are also used to validate or refine operational concepts.
Team composition, leadership, and team dynamics studies can be conducted during §
multi-week analog missions. (NEEMO)
Equipment stowage and deployment concepts can be tested using full scale mockups.§
Dust abatement equipment and techniques can be developed and partially tested §
terrestrially.
The design and functionality of crew displays and controls can be tested during analog §
missions.  The utility of this is directly proportional to the fidelity of the infrastructure 
available for the simulation. (Desert-RATS)
The sites and facilities used generally fall into one or more of the following four categories: 
landscape and geology, habitation, science operations, and engineering and technology field 
testing.
Landscape and geology:  This type of field site has physical features that resemble conditions on 
another planetary body.  The Haughton Crater area on Devon Island, Nunavut Territory, in the 
Canadian Arctic, and Barringer Crater, also know as Meteor Crater, east of Flagstaff, Arizona are 
examples of natural landscape analogs.  Both locations were hit by large meteorites that 
excavated craters and created other terrain and geological features similar to what we observe 
on the Moon and Mars.  Haughton crater is more than 20 km wide and is old and weathered. The 
surrounding rocks exhibit shatter and shock characteristics caused only by massive meteorite 
impacts (Figure 3).  The extremely sparse vegetation and dry, dusty conditions add to the Mars-
likeness of Devon Island’s environment (see Figure 2).   Barringer Crater is about 1.86 km wide, 
and it retains the classic impact crater shape.  The surrounding Arizona desert is also an 
excellent analog to the terrain, and dry, dusty conditions on the Moon and Mars.
   
         Figure 2 - Devon Island Terrain                          Figure 3 - Impact Shattered Rock
                  “Mars on Earth”                  
  
Accessibility is an important consideration for selecting geological analog sites.  Devon Island is 
probably the best geological Mars analog site available.  Unfortunately, it experiences only about 
a month of weather per year that permits reasonably safe operations, and its extremely remote 
location makes moving personnel and equipment in and out of there time consuming, 
complicated, and expensive.  More easily accessible analog sites, such as the Barringer Crater 
region in Arizona, or the Mars Society’s Mars Desert Research Station (MDRS) in the 
Canyonlands Desert of Utah, can host analog mission expeditions more frequently and at less 
expense.  
Landscape and geology analogs may also be artificial.  Both Johnson Space Center (JSC) and 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) use outdoor simulated Martian terrains to test surface 
exploration technologies and procedures in a somewhat realistic environment.  Both “rock 
gardens” simulate the distribution of rocks of different sizes typically encountered by Mars 
surface rovers.  These test facilities are reconfigurable to match conditions at specific landing 
sites.  JSC is in the process of constructing a lunar surface area with craters. JPL also has a tilt 
table covered with simulated martian soil for testing the maneuvering capabilities of robotic 
rovers on slopes, and an indoor facility for testing robotic rover operations in an extremely dusty 
environment, and in lighting and color conditions that can be varied to closely approximate those 
at specific sites on Mars.  Purely robotic technologies, human EVA equipment with suited test 
subjects, and combined human/robotic operations can be tested in these artificial environments 
under more controlled conditions, and without requiring extensive travel.  
Habitation:  These expedition sites have facilities that are analogous to life inside a space 
vehicle or a planetary surface habitat.  Such facilities may also be surrounded by extreme 
environmental conditions that isolate the crew in a confined, controlled space for life support.  A 
trip outside may require special equipment for survival.  The Aquarius undersea research facility 
owned by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and operated by 
the National Undersea Research Center (NURC) of the University of North Carolina at 
Wilmington (UNCW), is an excellent example of a habitat analog (Figure 4).  The Aquarius 
habitat is approximately the size of an International Space Station (ISS) module, and supports a 
crew of six.  Mars exploration studies have considered at least four and up to six personnel to be 
the most desirable crew size for work load, skill mix, and other human factors, depending on 
mission duration (Operations 2000).   The Aquarius habitat is moored to the ocean floor at a 
depth of sixty feet and three and a half miles off the coast of Key Largo, FL, in the Florida Keys 
National Marine Sanctuary.  NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations (NEEMO) 
missions to Aquarius typically last from ten days to two weeks.  NEEMO-9, conducted during 
April of 2006, lasted for 18 days and was the longest mission conducted in Aquarius as of May 
2006.
    
         Figure 4 - The Aquarius Undersea               Figure 5 - Divers Weighted to Simulate 
 Research Facility Near Key Largo, Florida                     Lunar Gravity (NEEMO-9)
Remaining at depth for these long periods of time (referred to as “saturation diving”) requires a 
lengthy decompression period before returning to the surface, so the Aquarius crew cannot 
immediately come home if something goes wrong.  “Extravehicular Activity” requires suiting up 
in diving gear, and by its nature, entails certain physical risks.  All of these elements contribute to 
a realistic analog for space flight, including EVA.  These expeditions have a double role as crew 
training for the ISS, and as exploration analog missions.  The hazardous environment requires 
that these missions be conducted with the same operational discipline and attention to safety as 
actual space missions.
Habitation analogs may also be located in more controlled, less hazardous environments, such 
as the simulated planetary surface habitat at the Johnson Space Center.  There are many 
advantages of such facilities.  They are much more easily reconfigurable and maintainable than 
field test sites and can therefore be used to test many different exploration analog mission 
architectures and scenarios.  Their use is not at the mercy of the weather, which is an important 
factor for scheduling field activ ities and conducting operations.  They can be operated in 
conjunction with outdoor field test sites, such as “rock garden” simulated Mars or lunar surfaces 
for EVA, telerobotic, and autonomous robotic operations.   Simulation scripts, ground rules, 
operational plans, and objectives can be defined with no need to accommodate competing 
interests from other participants that may have partially incompatible objectives.
Science Operations:  Although all exploration crews will include accomplished scientists, it will be 
impossible for a group of four to six people, no matter how experienced and well-trained, to know 
everything they might need to know on a long duration exploration mission.  Therefore, remote 
science operations and interaction between the crew, robotics, and a geographically distributed 
science team will be necessary.
 
There are several ways to conduct remote science operations.  One is for scientists, on Earth or 
some location other than the site being explored, to remotely command a robot as is currently 
done for NASA’s robotic exploration of the solar system.  For a science team on Earth to 
command a robot on Mars, they must create and test a sequence of commands for uplink at 
least a day before the robot is to execute the commands.  The finite speed of light and the desire 
to first evaluate the science and engineering data from the previous day’s activities, make this 
delay unavoidable.  After receiving the uplinked commands, the robot executes them on its own 
and later transmits the results to Earth.  If the science team is close enough to command the 
robot without significant time delay, then remote robotic operations can be conducted in real-time 
using teleoperation or even telepresence technologies.  
Another approach to remote science is “telementoring.”  In telementoring, a crewmember at the 
exploration location can perform unfamiliar operations while being coached by an expert at a 
remote location.  This may be done in real-time, or by training prior to the operation, or through 
some combination of both techniques.  Exploration analog missions provide an excellent vehicle 
for testing the techniques and technologies needed for remote science and medicine.  The NASA 
Oceanographic Analog Mission Activity (NOAMA) expeditions, that studied extremophiles and 
hydrothermal vents as an astrobiology analog, had none of the characteristics of geographical or 
habitat analog sites, but they were good examples of remote science operations conducted by an 
international science team (U.S., Australia, U.K., Russia) providing procedures to crewmembers 
who were not experts in the field (Figure 6).  Remote medical and lunar science operations have 
also been conducted during NEEMO missions with great success (Figure 7 and 8).
                           
Figure 6 - Sample Processing During NOAMA-1
                  
       Figure 7 - Telemedicine Operations                   Figure 8 - Remote Suturing Using 
                          (NEEMO-9)                                                  Robotics (NEEMO-9)
Engineering and Technology Field Testing:  Some analog sites are particularly good for testing 
the tools, EVA suits, communications gear, rovers, robotic assistants, and other equipment that 
explorers will use on the Moon and Mars.  Analog missions that are partly dedicated to 
engineering field tests subject the equipment and crewmembers to challenging terrain, dust and 
dirt, vibration and impacts, real lighting conditions, generally rough use, and sometimes 
temperature extremes.  Strengths and weaknesses in design or procedures, including 
telecommunications, quickly surface in natural test environments outside the laboratory.  These 
tests are also good for evaluating the physical exertion and mobility capabilities of suited test 
subjects, and anthropometric and ergonomic factors in equipment design.
Engineering and field test sites may be natural or artificial.  The annual Desert Research and 
Technology Studies (Desert RATS) expeditions occur at the Meteor Crater area in Arizona for 
field tests, but they also use the simulated Mars surface at JSC to prepare for the expeditions 
and for various tests throughout the year (Figure 9 and 10).
       
             Figure 9 - SCOUT Rover at JSC                   Figure 10 - EVA Equipment Testing 
                      Mars “Rock Garden”                                          (Desert RATS ’05)
Lunar Sortie Analogies 
Analog missions have received broad support from the Johnson Space Center (JSC). Many JSC 
Directorates support analog missions in various roles, including the following: Mission Operations 
Directorate (MOD), Engineering, Space & Life Sciences, Astromaterials Research & Exploration 
Science Directorate, Safety and Mission Assurance, as well as the Astronaut Office, 
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Office, Public Affairs, Education Outreach, and Office of Chief 
Counsel. In addition, the Information Resources Directorate, the Center Operations Directorate 
and the Office of Procurement provide information technology and facility development services. 
NOAA’s on-site National Weather Service (NWS) Spaceflight Meteorology Group (SMG) 
provides weather forecasts. The analog missions provide benefits to the Space Shuttle Program, 
International Space Station Program, and the Constellation Program. 
Other NASA centers participate with JSC in analog missions. These include Ames Research 
Center, Glenn Research Center, and Kennedy Space Center. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
(JPL) will likely participate with JSC in future analog missions. Other US government agencies 
(NOAA, US Navy, etc.) are also involved. In addition, universities, private industry, and research 
centers, both domestic and international, participate in various analog missions.
The Advanced Operations Cadre of the Mission Operations Directorate, which operates the 
Exploration Planning and Operations Center (ExPOC), has participated in sixteen missions as of 
May of 2006. This includes seven NEEMO missions, five Desert RATS missions, two Haughton 
Mars Projects (HMP), and two NOAMA missions. Each mission has specific lunar sortie 
analogies and applications. 
The ExPOC consists of a flight control team with specific console positions (Figure 11). The Ops 
Director, Communications and Activities Officer (CAO), DATA, Remote Operated Vehicle 
(ROV), Science Officer, and various additional DATA positions with emphasis on EVA suits as 
appropriate for the given mission. 
The ExPOC team develops procedures for the crew and for the ExPOC team itself. The team is 
involved in pre-mission planning, mission execution, and post-mission activities. Objectives and 
flight rules are also developed as appropriate for specific missions. In addition, the ExPOC team 
has a full set of console tools and applications such as interactive traverse mapping tools, EVA 
crewmember tracking tools, crew navigation tools, ROV driving software, data collection sheets, 
logging software, telemetry viewing systems, and procedure and timeline viewing systems. In 
addition, the ExPOC team uses the MCC voice communication system to the extent practical for 
the given mission. The ExPOC team conducts simulations by themselves and with the crew prior 
to the analog missions, just as is done with space missions.
 
Figure 11 - ExPOC Team
The following descriptions of analog missions focus on the characteristics of the analog missions 
that have parallels in lunar sortie “mission operations.” Various other aspects of the mission may 
be mentioned briefly, but not expanded upon in detail. 
NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations (NEEMO) 
As noted earlier, the NEEMO missions are executed using the Aquarius habitat. 
JSC conducted nine NEEMO missions between 2001 and April of 2006. The 18-day NEEMO-9 
occurred in April, 2006 and was the longest mission in Aquarius to date. The IVA focus on 
NEEMO-9 was on telemedicine, telementoring, and telerobotic surgery. NEEMO-10 and 11 will 
be entirely exploration focused and are scheduled for July and September of 2006, respectively. 
NEEMO missions are managed by a team from the Mission Operations Directorate, led by 
Training Division personnel. The MOD Advanced Operations Cadre (AOC) operates the 
Exploration Planning and Operations Center (ExPOC) as a Mission Control Center (MCC) for the 
EVA portions of the missions. Each crew consists of three astronauts, a scientist, and two NURC 
habitat technicians. 
By virtue of the use of the Aquarius habitat, the NEEMO missions are an excellent habitation 
analog. Although the environment is different, the excursions outside the habitat provide a 
surface EVA analog.
By virtue of operating with the Aquarius habitat, the crew experience is much the same as that of 
a space-based crew. A broad variety of life sciences, human factors, physiological factors, and 
psychological factors are assessed during a typical NEEMO mission.  Many types of scientific 
activities have been conducted, including life science, telemedicine, and telerobotic activities 
(Figure 12). In recent missions, the exploration mission analog has focused almost exclusively 
on the use of dives as analogs to surface EVA’s.
During NEEMO missions, the crew lives in the Aquarius Habitat for the entire duration of the 
mission, thus all of their activities are part of the analog mission. Their activities closely 
resemble the tasks of a lunar surface “sortie” crew and virtually every activity the crew performs 
has a lunar mission analogy.
IVA tasks include meal preparation, pre-sleep and post-sleep activities, private medical 
conferences, private family conferences, journals, PAO events, education outreach events, and 
habitat maintenance. All of this is in addition to reviewing the daily activity plan, participating in 
DPCs with ExPOC / MCC, performing ROV operations, and, of course, conducting scientific 
experiments. Most activities documented by the crew with photos or video which must then be 
managed and distributed.
In addition, the crew conducts EVAs outside the habitat using scuba gear or helmeted diving 
systems with life support umbilicals.  Even though the physical environments are different, the 
NEEMO EVA crews perform the same types of tasks that a lunar EVA team will perform. These 
include EVA prep (suit donning, etc.), EVA setup tasks (e.g. tool management, camera 
positioning), EVA surface activities (excursions, lunar samples, structure construction, etc.), EVA 
clean-up tasks (tool return, worksite cleanup, etc.) and post-EVA tasks (suit clean-up, equipment 
management and data downloads, etc.). The NEEMO crews have some additional 
considerations in terms of operating within specified depth limits and securing equipment so it 
won’t float away. Other aspects of the underwater dive experience translate nicely to lunar 
analogies. These include operating in buddy teams of two, maintaining situational awareness, 
staying within visual contact of an excursion line so they won’t get lost in unknown territory, 
maintaining contact with the IVA crew and/or MCC, managing air consumables during scuba 
EVAs, and re-filling air tanks during scuba EVAs from either the Aquarius habitat or a remote 
waystation.  The ExPOC serves as the MCC during EVAs and formal communication protocols 
simulate space operations.
During NEEMO-9 a diver tracking system (IVA and MCC can see diver locations real-time) and 
diver navigation system (guides crew to waypoints, directs crew in a grid mode search pattern, 
allows crew to mark points of interest, records the crew’s path and maps the terrain) were utilized 
for the first time. NEEMO-9 was the first mission test of these systems and uncovered some 
operational challenges. NEEMO-10 and 11 will provide a continued opportunity to assess the 
usefulness and robustness of these systems. While the technologies will be different, the same 
or similar functions will likely be available on the Moon. Both the ExPOC team and the crew 
found the Diver Tracking System to be useful during the mission to provide situational 
awareness. The navigation system was useful in terms of being able to mark locations in the 
field and send the data back to the ExPOC. In addition, the ExPOC could plan missions, upload 
them to the crew, and the crew execute the mission profiles during the EVA.
The NEEMO missions are overseen by a “distributed mission control team” consisting of the 
NASA Topside team (overall mission management, timeline updates, and on-site logistics), the 
ExPOC (MCC role for EVAs and primary for EVA content replanning), and the NURC watch desk 
(Aquarius systems monitoring and crew safety). There is also an international science team with 
some representatives on-site and others at their remote locations. While this model is different 
than that of a lunar control team, it provides experience with the distributed nature of future 
control teams (partners at multiple NASA centers).
As with all analog missions, an adequate communications network is essential. While greatly 
increased from previous years, the finite bandwidth limits the number of simultaneous activities 
and connections and affects the quality and update rates of the video. The communications 
network allows the crew to communicate by phone and internet (video, data, etc.). The ExPOC 
team talked with the crew by phone or internet voice during EVAs (dives) and talked with the 
crew during DPCs and other times. 
NEEMO-9 exploration scenario was developed pre-mission, but much of the mission was 
dedicated to solving technical and operational issues with the new equipment. The following are 
some of the exploration analogs for NEEMO-9.
ROV teleoperations (driving) by MCC/ExPOC·
Camera views for driving ROV – onboard and birds-eye·
Movable camera onboard ROV during EVAs commanded by MCC for MCC (and IVA) ·
situational awareness and photo-documentation
ROV technical capabilities required for exploration tasks (e.g. rock sample collection, ·
vehicle inspection)
Crew and ROV/robotic interaction during EVA·
EVA crewmember navigation and tracking capabilities·
MCC and IVA interactions during EVAs·
Various EVA Suit center-of-gravity (cg) configurations were tested·
EVA Task efficiency and work efficiency·
 
Figure 12 - ROV Driving, Lunar Science Tele-mentoring, Waterlab Construction
Desert Research and Technology Studies (Desert RATS)
As described earlier, Desert RATS missions are executed near Meteor Crater and Cinder Lake, 
which provide a lunar-like geologic and landscape test area (Figure 13). The focus of the tests is 
on Advanced EVA suit tests and the associated hardware and support systems. This includes a 
reconfigurable backpack that contains system monitoring software, crew position tracking and 
onboard navigation system, automated user interface software, voice recognition software for 
specific applications, and a wireless communication system. The specific applications are 
developed by other NASA centers, academia, and industry. The integration of the various 
systems is one of the challenges faced by the NASA JSC Engineering Directorate. 
In addition to the EVA suit tests, a portion of Desert RATS is typically focused on the use of EVA 
robotic assistants and/or rovers that can transport the crew members. An EVA crewmember may 
also ride on a “chariot” pulled by an electronic tractor. In addition, a reconfigurable science trailer 
provides a basis for the science portion of a lunar science sample collection scenario. Depending 
on the equipment configuration for a given year, the science trailer may be pulled by a robot, 
rover, or the electronic tractor.
The Desert RATS field tests are managed by the JSC Engineering Directorate, but as with most 
analog missions, have broad participation from other organizations.  
The mission operations scenario consists of the suited EVA runs and science planning meetings 
before and after the suited runs. These portions are high fidelity, but only capture a thin slice of a 
lunar mission. The short duration of the suited EVAs limits the duration of each test. The main 
focus of the mission operations analog was science procedures. High fidelity suits, science 
trailer, tools and sample bags were used. 
The ExPOC Science Officer and Science Team, residing at the ExPOC, uses geologic lidar 
images and pre-mission flight rules and science priorities to select the coordinates for the sample 
locations and the type of sample procedure for the crew to conduct (rock, surface soil, etc.) 
(Arnold 2005). 
The following were some of the exploration analogs for Desert RATS -05:
Science scenario – lidar imaging. ExPOC science team selected sites. Science ·
officer and science team worked together. Planning meetings with IVA team prior to 
EVA
Communication bandwidth: data transfers were slow and took a lot of time in the ·
evening
Data management challenging with data (photos, lidar images, reports, files, etc.) ·
stored in multiple locations 
Crew equipment and software (HUD, positioning system, system monitoring, voice ·
activated system, etc) testing.
Rover driving. ·
ExPOC situational awareness (visual) was limited. Voice loops provided interaction, ·
but the primary use was for the operational hardware field test.
Data connections with ExPOC included rover driving (while manned), video ·
cameras, audio, etc. EVA suit telemetry was not available due to the JSC firewall 
configuration.
 
Figure 13 – Desert RATS analog mission (overview pictures)
Haughton-Mars Project (HMP)
As noted earlier, the Haughton Mars Project is conducted at Haughton Crater on Devon Island in 
Nunavut, Canada. It is an exceptional geographical and science ops analog for Mars missions. 
HMP tested concepts for human exploration operations with altered roles for the crew and MCC.  
During HMP 1999 and 2000, a subset of the field team participated in the mission operations 
scenario. There was a high fidelity Mars mission simulation, three weeks in duration.  
The Mars time delays were simulated in a rigorous fashion by adhering to strict guidelines about 
communication. The entire mission was designed with processes similar to those anticipated in a 
Mars mission. For example, the data was sent from the crew to MCC overnight. MCC developed 
an activity plan for the crew for the next day. A formal file structure was in place on a common-
access server to accommodate data transfers. 
ExPOC operations that were akin to lunar operations, even though it was an Mars simulation, 
included the following:
Assisted with daily activity planning, traverse route planning, maintenance, •
weather forecasting, remote science, etc. 
Worked with HMP and university science teams on Devon Island and Principal •
Investigators in the U. S. and Canada
Established daily communications schedules, formats, and protocols •
Imposed simulated light time delay for communications •
The ExPOC team developed an off-nominal situation for a weather station and •
the field crew was able to repair the weather station during the mission.
Dust got into “everything” (tent zippers, equipment, etc.)•
Communication bandwidth: data transfers were “slow” and took a lot of field •
team time in the evening
During HMP 2006 (July), the ExPOC team has been invited to participate in a one-day 
emergency DTO (Detailed Test Objective) with ExPOC issuing commands to a rover.
Figure 14 - Ops Tent Laptops,Weather Station, andOps Tent on Devon Island
NASA Oceanographic Analog Mission Activity (NOAMA)
NOAMA was a joint film-making and exploration activity at Atlantic and Pacific hydrothermal 
vent sites coordinated between NASA, Blue Planet Marine Research Foundation and XTREME 
Life Productions, Inc. (James Cameron, director). NOAMA was designed to be a science ops 
analog mission emulating astrobiology research in the solar system. It was primarily a science 
operations mission requiring extensive coordination between crew, the local control facility and 
support scientists located around the world (U.S., Australia, U.K.).  NASA personnel spent a lot 
of time being part of the documentary film on the geology and life forms surrounding 
hydrothermal vents.
The NASA JSC Crew performed science operations (sample recovery, processing, and 
preservation) aboard ship but did not dive in the subs.
ExPOC roles and lunar analogs:
Coordinated international science team teleconferences between the crew and •
distributed Prinicipal Investigators (PIs). The PI’s were from Europe, Australia, and 
various parts of the US.
Coordinated development and transmission of sample processing protocols for the crew •
with international PIs. It was necessary for the Science Officer to convert the inputs from 
the scientists into appropriate information (e.g. procedures) for the crew
ExPOC team members participated in live educational outreach activities between the •
ship, JSC, and schools in the U.S. and Australia.
 Arranged for shipping, storage, and preservation of the samples post-mission.•
Coordinated weather forecast support with the JSC Space Flight Meteorological Group •
(SMG).
Responded to crew requests to research information on biological and geological •
samples from the ocean floor with which none of them were familiar.  Involved internet 
searches and finding researchers who were added to the remote science team.
The voice communication with the field team was limited. Communication was primarily •
in the evenings and the schedule was not adhered to strictly due to the competing 
demands of the mission. 
The limited data transfer bandwidth meant that only a few low resolution photos were •
transferred during the mission. Most photos were transferred after the mission. 
Lessons Learned
Human/Robotic Interaction and Situational Awareness
Joint human and robotic operations have been demonstrated during several exploration analog 
missions.  The ninth NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations (NEEMO-9) mission 
conducted during April 2006 demonstrated human/robotic interactions both inside the Aquarius 
undersea habitat and during EVA.  A major objective of both NEEMO-9 and NEEMO-7 was to 
demonstrate telemedicine techniques.  Surgical procedures could become necessary for a crew 
that is living for months in a spacecraft or a lunar outpost.  During NEEMO-9, a cut in simulated 
human skin was successfully sutured using robotic manipulators in a simulator box.
Operators in the Aquarius habitat and the Exploration Planning and Operations Center (ExPOC) 
in Houston remotely commanded an ROV during the NEEMO-9 mission.  The ROV could either 
crawl along the sea floor or swim through the water.  It had a steerable camera, a light with 
variable brightness, and a small gripper arm.  The ROV’s maneuverability and its camera made 
it useful for video-documenting EVA activities during construction of an underwater structure 
called WaterLab.  The operators could monitor activity through the ROV camera, which 
improved situational awareness for the teams in the ExPOC and the habitat.  The ROV also 
served as a robotic assistant delivering parts and tools to the EVA construction crew.  While this 
was challenging for the small vehicle used during NEEMO-9, the activity demonstrated the 
feasibility of this type of robotic assistance.  
In general, it was easier to operate the ROV from the habitat than from the ExPOC in Houston.  
This was because the Intra-Vehicular Activity (IVA) crew could see both the camera’s video feed 
and the view out the habitat porthole, at least for part of the ROV excursion.  The IVA crew also 
had the advantage of having performed EVAs themselves, and they were personally familiar 
with the sea floor and the obstacles in the area around the habitat.  There was also a slightly 
shorter command-response delay for the IVA crew than for the ExPOC team, but the delay was 
short enough that it did not greatly impede the ExPOC team’s ability to safely operate the 
vehicle.  Command-response time is crucial for effective and safe telerobotic operations.  During 
the 2005 Desert RATS expedition the communications link between the field site and the ExPOC 
caused too much command-response delay to allow the ExPOC operators to remotely command 
the manned rover effectively.  The rover could be driven short distances and stopped.  Once the 
video from the camera caught up, the operator could assess the rover’s new location and plan 
another short move.  Real-time, continuous operation was not safe with this command-response 
lag of several seconds.  The rover team at the field site was able to remotely command the rover 
in real-time.  
Various robotic assistants have been tested extensively during Desert RATS expeditions.  These 
assistants have carried equipment for the EVA crew, and have also performed work.  During the 
2004 Desert RATS mission, a robotic assistant vehicle implanted a series of geophones in the 
ground, thus saving the suited EVA crewmember considerable physical exertion.  For EVA, this 
translates into conserved life support consumables, and possibly less wear on the suit.  Robots 
that do physical work must be able to exert as much force as is required to perform the most 
challenging task expected.  Some of the soil encountered during the geophone exercise was too 
hard for the robot to firmly implant the geophones.  
Desert RATS expeditions have also successfully tested technologies that enable a rover or 
robotic assistant to follow the walking crewmember and respond to both radioed voice 
commands and hand signals.  A general finding about robotic assistants is that they are useful 
only if they are capable of moving at least as quickly as the walking suited crewmember, and can 
negotiate equally rough terrain.  If the robot is too slow, or needs help getting over or around 
obstacles, the crewmember becomes the assistant for the robot.
The Influence of Communications on Crew and Mission Control Operational Roles:
Communications between the crew and the Earth for operations in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) are 
essentially instantaneous and almost continuous.  Normal conversations are possible, and the 
crew can request information and expect a fairly quick response.  The round trip communications 
time-delay for operations on the lunar near side is only about 2.5 seconds.  When human crews 
venture deeper into the solar system the finite speed of light will impose an unavoidable 
communications time delay that is measured in minutes rather than seconds.  A crew on a 
conjunction class mission to Mars would experience a communications delay of more than 40 
minutes, not counting the time taken to formulate a reply, when Mars and the Earth are on 
opposite sides of the sun.  This single factor will alter the traditional roles of the earthbound 
operations teams and the flight crew, and the capabilities that must exist aboard the spacecraft 
and surface habitat.  The NASA HMP analog missions simulated a communications time delay 
to study this shift in operational roles.  The NOAMA missions had such limited satellite phone 
communications, that the results were practically the same as they would have been with an 
intentionally simulated speed of light delay.  Technical problems with the communications 
infrastructure can also result in significant interruptions to the normal communications flow.
The HMP mission plans defined specific blocks of time during which message uplinks from the 
Mission Control Center and downlinks from Devon Island were to take place.  Direct, real-time 
communications were only allowed for scheduled planning conferences and for emergencies, 
during which the analog mission simulation would have been suspended.  The planned downlink 
and uplink messages had predefined outlines.  The content of the downlinks included 
consumables status data (food, fuel oil, water, etc.), EVA traverse reports (positioning data plus 
narrative descriptions of discoveries and activities), field science reports (narrative, data, 
images), the status of equipment, summaries of the day’s activities, safety reports, private 
medical data, requests for information or advice from the operations, science, or medical teams, 
and requests for assistance troubleshooting problems.  The uplinks included daily plans for the 
coming day (science team requests and instructions, action items), including suggested traverse 
routes, answers to questions from the previous downlink, in-flight maintenance procedures, 
surface and solar weather forecasts, and consumables usage predictions based on observed 
trends.  The MCC team also added some news items and humor to the uplinks, which is also 
done during Space Shuttle missions and International Space Station increments.
The time delay required disciplined communications protocols and skills by both the crew and the 
mission operations team.  Early in the HMP missions there were problems with ambiguity in the 
message traffic that caused misunderstandings or forced the crew, the mission operations team, 
or the science team to ask time-delayed questions.  Technical difficulties with communications 
equipment, mostly caused by the harsh natural environment, aggravated the problem.  There 
were several mission simulations in preparation for these missions, and effective uplink and 
downlink message formats were developed, but the magnitude of the impact of non-real-time 
communications on operations was still underestimated.  
Instructions in uplinks had to be reviewed before transmission to determine if there was more 
than one way to interpret them, and to make sure that all of the required information was 
included in the message.  Incomplete instructions were just as much of a problem as ambiguous 
ones.  Photographs and illustrations were helpful.  An unplanned maintenance activity on the 
portable Devon Island weather station was a success because clear photographs of the correct 
equipment configuration were included with the narrative, and the instructions themselves were 
precise, and adapted directly from the user’s manual.  The mission operations team also 
successfully planned a traverse route for the all-terrain vehicles.  The plan included an aerial 
photograph with the route marked on it, and the EVA team had no difficulty finding the route and 
executing the plan.  The science team in Houston initially had trouble matching images of rock 
and biological samples in the downlink data with the locations visited by the EVA crews, because 
the image file names did not make this correlation, and the narrative descriptions provided in the 
downlinked science summaries were sometimes unclear.  There were also ambiguities in the 
narratives about the locations of finds.  In one case, the crew reported having stopped “by the 
lake” to perform a certain activity, but the traverse map showed several lakes along the route.  
The teams on Devon Island and in Houston both improved their time-delayed communications 
skills fairly early in the missions.  The Devon Island crew made the interesting observation that 
support from Houston was a positive morale factor.  Just the fact of knowing that a team in 
Houston was continually aware of their presence and working issues they had identified made 
them feel better.  There is a palpable sense of isolation from the rest of humanity on a barren 
island in the arctic where the weather is windy and cold even in mid-summer.  Maintaining crew 
morale in the face of this effect should be a high priority for long missions to a lunar outpost, and 
especially for missions to Mars.
The shift in how operational responsibilities were divided between the crew and the mission 
operations and science teams was quite apparent during both the HMP and NOAMA missions.  
Instantaneous, real-time support was impossible, so any actions requiring on-the-spot decisions 
were completely up to the crew, and the planners in Houston had to adapt to any significant 
changes.  As long as the top level objectives for the day were accomplished, it didn’t matter how 
the crew chose to schedule their work, or which crewmembers performed which tasks.  Micro-
scheduling of tasks would have been futile in any case, because situations continually arose in 
the field that required flexibility and changes of plans.  When top level objectives were not fully 
accomplished, the teams in Houston had to alter future plans according to mission priorities.  
Consumables tracking activities for the HMP were analogous to systems monitoring for the 
Space Shuttle or Space Station, with the difference that none of the data were observable in real-
time.  Trends were used to predict consumables quantities that would be available to the crew as 
a function of time, which helped them to make decisions about usage rates. 
The NOAMA missions, conducted in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans aboard the Russian 
research vessel M. V. Keldysh, were work intensive for the NASA JSC crew, and the limited 
communications presented big challenges for the team in the JSC Exploration Planning and 
Operations Center (ExPOC).   For sample processing they had to use the initially unfamiliar 
Russian laboratory equipment, which required creative improvisation for some tasks.  NASA, 
university, and Russian science teams shared limited shipboard laboratory resources.  The 
ExPOC served primarily as a center for coordinating science team activities, and as a kind of 
remote research assistant for the crew.  The JSC crew (an astronaut/oceanographer and a 
planetary scientist) were not familiar with the types of geological and extremophile biological 
samples that were brought up from hydrothermal vents on the ocean floor.  Although several 
sets of procedures for processing hydrothermal vent samples were created before the missions 
began, this was done without knowing exactly what would be discovered during the mission.  The 
pre-existing procedures all turned out to be relevant and valuable, but new ones were essential 
as new discoveries came to light.  To perform proper sample processing, curation, and 
cataloging the crew used detailed new procedures from the international science team, who were 
distributed across the U.S., Australia, and Great Britain.  
These experts on hydrothermal vents and their associated ecosystems were not familiar with 
NASA operational procedures, and as individuals, lacked the “big picture” of all the activities that 
were taking place aboard ship.  The ExPOC team’s challenge was to coordinate science 
planning conferences between the crew, the ExPOC, and the distributed team, and to translate 
instructions from diverse authors into standardized crew procedures, without omitting or altering 
important information in the process.  Operating across time zones in the central U.S., the U.K., 
Australia, and the mid-Atlantic and east-Pacific oceans, was a challenge in itself.  The ExPOC 
team also helped the crew to identify unknown samples and provided images from previous 
research of some of the life forms that were being brought up by the submersibles.  Although 
there were some real-time planning conferences, the crew received no direct, real-time 
assistance from the ExPOC during science operations.  This was analogous to science 
operations within a surface habitat on Mars.  
After the NOAMA missions, the JSC crewmembers commented on how vital it was that their 
sample handling instructions had been reformatted into standardized procedures.  Had this not 
been done, they might have fallen hopelessly behind in their laboratory work.  The ExPOC 
team’s data gathering on samples unfamiliar to the crew, and the science planning conferences 
were also helpful. 
Work Activities Scheduling and Mission Priorities
Because of the intense level of effort, and enormous expense of sending human explorers to 
other planetary bodies, there is an understandable desire to get as much productive work out of 
the crew as possible.  However, experience with both actual space flight and exploration analog 
missions has clearly shown that if the crew’s work load is excessively burdensome, a densely 
packed schedule can quickly reach a point of diminishing returns.   Excessively loaded 
schedules lack the margin needed to respond effectively to delays or contingencies that require 
replanning to meet the highest priority mission objectives.  
It is easy to underestimate the time overhead associated with operating in an alien environment.  
An activity schedule that would be perfectly reasonable on Earth in a controlled, low-stress 
setting, can be overwhelming to a crew in space or on another planet.  During the NASA 
Haughton-Mars Project expedition in 2000, the harsh natural environment (cold temperatures, 
wind, rain, and fine, blowing dust) caused equipment problems that occupied a large percentage 
of the field team’s time.  In order to accomplish mission objectives and keep everything working, 
the team put in extremely long hours, which resulted in excessive fatigue during the three-week 
mission.  Blowing dust fouled everything from commercial off-the-shelf digital video cameras to 
tent zippers.  The cold caused intermittent failures in laptop computers that weren’t specifically 
designed for extreme environments.  Strong wind caused the satellite dish antenna to wobble, 
resulting in data dropouts and a general loss of bandwidth.  At one point, rainwater had to be 
drained out of the satellite antenna’s feedhorn.  These problems made file transfers to and from 
Devon Island unreliable and extremely time-consuming.  There were also difficulties in 
generating sufficient electrical power for all of the computers and other electrical equipment on 
the island, which caused brown-outs and slowed the work of archiving data and producing files 
and reports for the mission operations and science teams.
Besides the obvious need to ensure that all equipment is sufficiently robust to function reliably in 
the field environment, crew activity schedules must include time for rest, relaxation, personal 
hygiene, and margin for problem solving.  When the finite speed of light, or other factors impose 
significant delays in two-way communication, the crew needs the authority and flexibility to 
schedule most of their own daily activities.  The HMP science and mission operations teams 
provided the high level mission objectives and broad guidelines for attaining those objectives.
Because of the extremely limited communications available for the NOAMA missions all of the 
work scheduling had to be done aboard ship.  This was a challenge because the JSC science 
analog mission competed for time, people, and material resources with the objectives of the 
team producing a documentary film, and the Russian and university science teams.  Priorities 
had to be negotiated among all of the participants, with occasional non-real-time input from the 
ExPOC relayed through the JSC crewmembers.  During an actual long-duration mission to the 
Moon or Mars, top-level mission priorities will have been decided before launch, but a 
mechanism must be in place for revising those priorities based upon significant new discoveries, 
or operational contingencies.  Recommendations from the crew, the operations team, the 
science team, the flight surgeons, engineering support, and program management will all factor 
into the final decisions.  Actions that can’t wait for a decision from Earth will have to be taken by 
the crew, and the operations and science teams will have to adapt their planning accordingly.
Schedule overloading is not unique to space crews, but can also affect the operations team on 
Earth.  During the NEEMO-9 mission, several dives had to be replanned when data sets required 
to create EVA mission profiles for an underwater navigation system for upcoming dives were not 
available to the operations team because of technical difficulties.  The ExPOC operations 
paradigm for NEEMO-9 typically scheduled two shifts of three people, for approximately twelve 
hours of operations support per day.  The ExPOC operations team positions were the Operations 
Director (OPS), the Communications and Activities Officer (CAO), and the data officer (DATA).  
For some shifts, a ROV operator joined the team.  Software support personnel came in 
periodically to monitor the performance of developmental logging software being tested in an 
operational environment.  When not on console, ExPOC personnel were doing other work, 
usually unrelated to NEEMO-9, in their offices.  For most of the time during lunar outpost 
missions, and missions to Mars, a complete operations team will not be supporting twenty four 
hours per day, seven days per week.  Many personnel will do other work and be on call except 
for scheduled mission support periods during special activities that require their presence.  
NEEMO-9 was more dedicated to exploration analog operations than any previous NEEMO 
mission.  As a result, the ExPOC team’s role included more pre-mission and real-time 
operational planning than ever before.  The potential for technical contingencies increasing the 
ExPOC team’s real-time planning workload was anticipated, but the magnitude of its affect was 
underestimated in pre-mission planning, and resulted in insufficient team depth.  When several 
future dives had to be completely replanned, the task fell to the operations team on-console.  
Fortunately, operations team members who were not on-console were able to help the on-duty 
team work on the EVA plans in the ExPOC’s planning and conference area while real-time dive 
support was taking place in the operations area.  The “Topside” team at Key Largo, Florida also 
assisted with replanning some dives.  The EVAs were successfully replanned in time for the pre-
dive conferences with the crew, but the extra team members required for this worked long hours 
at the expense of other tasks.  It is normal and expected in human space flight operations to 
work extra hours to resolve problems, but much of this work is often done by a backup team 
(Replan Team) designated for this purpose, and the replanning does not interfere with ongoing 
operations.  The ExPOC had no such team, and the extensive replanning activity graphically 
illustrated the need for a Replan Team.
GENERAL LUNAR SORTIE SURFACE SCENARIO
A lunar mission consists of several phases. Figure 1 contains a notional illustration of a complete 
lunar sortie mission as depicted in April, 2006 on the public website 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/exploration/spacecraft. 
A heavy-lift rocket blasts off, carrying a lunar lander and a "departure stage" needed to leave 
Earth's orbit (below left). The crew launches separately (below, center), then docks their vehicle 
with the lander and departure stage and heads for the Moon (below, right). 
Three days later, the crew goes into lunar orbit (below, left). The four astronauts climb into the 
lander, leaving the vehicle to wait for them in orbit. After landing and exploring the surface for 
seven days, the crew blasts off in a portion of the lander (below, center), docks with the crew 
vehicle and travels back to Earth. After a de-orbit burn, the service module is jettisoned, exposing 
the heat shield for the first time in the mission. The parachutes deploy, the heat shield is 
dropped, and the crew vehicle sets down on dry land (below, right).
Figure 1 - Lunar “Sortie” Mission Overview
The lunar surface operations phase begins when the lander, also known as the Lunar Surface 
Access Module (LSAM) lands on the lunar surface and continues until the LSAM lifts off from the 
surface. 
The LSAM serves as the crew’s combined habitat and laboratory for the lunar “sortie” missions. It 
contains all required life support systems and associated consumables (air, water, etc). The 
LSAM has an airlock for crew Extravehicular Activity (EVA) ingress and egress. In addition, the 
LSAM may be required to transport the tools, robots, and rover as required for the mission, 
(unless a cargo vehicle is sent pre-mission to the lunar surface with this equipment). 
Limitations to the amount of mass the LSAM can lift into lunar orbit will necessitate the selection 
of the best lunar samples for return to Earth. In addition, the crew may be forced to leave some 
items on the surface as was done during the Apollo missions.  Candidates include the descent 
stage, dry trash, rover(s), and tools.
Initial Surface Configuration Activities
After landing on the lunar surface, the crew performs post-landing activities such as LSAM 
systems’ reconfiguration for surface operations, cabin configuration, suit doffing and temporary 
stowage (if necessary), waste management center and galley activation, seat reconfigurations (if 
necessary), and a meal.  
Daily Activities
While on the lunar surface, daily activities consist of postsleep activities, EVAs, LSAM daily 
systems’ checks and reconfigurations, and presleep activities. 
Once on the lunar surface, daily activities associated with the crew’s health and well being are 
similar to those occurring on transit days between the Earth and the Moon with the addition of 
EVAs.  Each day begins with postsleep activities including a meal, hygiene tasks, LSAM system 
and cabin configurations, and review  of the daily changes to procedures and the day’s activities.  
The bulk of the crew day is focused on preparation for and execution of EVA operations.  A daily 
exercise routine is not required because the crew exertion during an EVA provides adequate 
exercise and satisfies the requirement for daily exercise.  Following the EVA operations, pre-
sleep activities include a meal, housekeeping, Public Affairs Office (PAO) events, a Daily 
Planning Conference (DPC), a Private Medical Conference (PMC), occasional Family 
Conferences, LSAM systems’ configuration for crew sleep, and configuration of sleep 
accommodations.  During the sleep period, at least one crewmember has the ability to hear 
audible caution and warning tones, if these annunciate, as well as communication capability with 
the ground.
Surface EVAs
The emphasis of the lunar surface activities is on EVAs and the scientific activities performed on 
each one.  On the Moon, all four crew members of the LSAM have the capability to don surface 
EVA suits and egress the vehicle through an airlock to simultaneously conduct operations on the 
lunar surface.  By operating in an EVA buddy-mode (two 2-person teams) with all four crew 
members on the surface every day, the scientific and operational value of the mission is 
maximized. The crew’s activities focus on exploration science and technology demonstrations for 
further development of lunar EVAs and for preparing for Mars surface operations.
Sortie surface missions lasting four days will have EVAs each day. The first (landing) and last 
(ascent) days may have shorter duration EVAs of 4-6 hours, while the middle two days each 
have a full 6-8 hour EVA period. Longer duration sortie missions of 5, 6 or 7 days have additional 
EVAs, with the flexibility to conduct some of these EVAs with just two crewmembers to provide a 
rest day if needed for each crewmember, or a day when two crewmembers can stay in the LSAM 
and perform Intra-Vehicular Activities (IVA).  
The IVA crew may directly support the EVA by tele-operating robotic assistants, transmitting data 
requested by the EVA crew, and monitoring their equipment and movements.   Other IVA tasks 
could include maintenance and cleaning of EVA equipment not in use, remote operation of 
surface experiments, and some degree of sample screening in conjunction with the Earth-based 
science team to determine which specimens have the greatest merit for return to Earth.  This 
assumes that sample handling can be done inside the LSAM without contaminating either the 
samples or the cabin environment.  Such capability within the LSAM will be limited at best.  
During lunar outpost missions, the habitat will have laboratory facilities where analysis that is 
safe for both the specimens and the cabin environment can be performed.  
Surface mobility systems, such as a rover, are used to allow all crew members to efficiently 
explore the local lunar area surrounding the LSAM.  A rover plays a key role in providing EVA 
crew, tool, and geologic sample mobility on the surface, and also enables longer duration EVAs 
by alleviating crewmember fatigue, reducing suit consumable use, and possibly providing suit 
consumable resupply.  
The LSAM has an airlock capability, so that the entire LSAM crew cabin does not have to be 
depressurized when performing an EVA. This allows the flexibility of having some of the crew 
stay inside the vehicle in an IVA shirt-sleeve environment if needed during an EVA. An airlock 
also provides a staging area for checking out and servicing the spacesuits, and is a barrier for 
reducing the amount of lunar dust that enters the LSAM cabin.  Various low volume airlock 
designs, that result in little loss of atmosphere during an airlock cycle, are being studied.
EVA Prep Operations
Prior to exiting the LSAM, the crew performs their suit configuration tasks and checkout 
activities. All critical life support functions including backup systems are verified and spacesuit 
pressure integrity is confirmed by performing a leak check. Suit telemetry during both checkout 
and surface operations is monitored by flight controllers in the Mission Control Center (MCC). 
When possible this data will be monitored real-time. Even if data is received real-time, all results 
from the checkout are downlinked to the ground for analysis.  
Once the suits are donned, the crew pressurizes the suits.  During prebreathe operations (if 
necessary based on vehicle design), the crew performs communication checks with MCC, the 
LSAM (if an IVA crewmember is present), and with each other. In addition, the crew will perform 
final checks of the suit and airlock systems to prepare for airlock depressurization and EVA.
At the completion of the prebreathe operations, the crew is ready to depressurize the airlock(s) to 
vacuum. Once an airlock is at vacuum, the crew transfers the suits from airlock umbilical power 
to internal suit power to initiate usage of in-suit consumables. The “outer” airlock hatch is opened 
and the crew egresses the LSAM. 
EVA duration is determined by crew physiological limits, suit consumables, and scheduling 
limitations such as same-day lunar ascent. Past EVA experience indicates that continued useful 
work can be expected for EVAs no more than six to eight hours duration.  This duration also 
allows daily non-EVA activities such as pre and post sleep operations, meals, etc. to fit within an 
acceptable crew day length. This time duration is longer than Apollo EVAs and back to back 
EVAs are beyond Shuttle and ISS experience. This EVA plan may have to be modified based on 
testing with 1/6th gravity.  Modern surface EVA suits are expected to be more comfortable, 
provide a more extensive range of motion, and be less fatiguing to wear than Apollo-era suits.  
In the event, that an EVA crewmember needs to recharge their suit consumables while they are 
outside the LSAM, recharge stations can be provided at various locations. Possible locations for 
these recharge stations are on the vehicle (e.g., LSAM exterior), on the rover, or in designated 
spots on the lunar surface.  If a recharge capability exists on the rover, this would allow the EVA 
crew to recharge suit consumables while driving around the lunar surface, thus minimizing the 
timeline impacts for the recharge.
As with the Space Shuttle spacesuit, consumables are automatically monitored and estimated 
remaining operating time is presented to the crewmember as part of the suit system status. 
When combined with location data from the rover’s navigation system, the time to return to the 
LSAM can be estimated. The advanced in-suit caution and warning monitoring of suit 
consumables, as well as crew locator system data is downlinked to the MCC in order to safely 
manage the EVAs.  This automated system can alert the crew when it is necessary to travel back 
to the LSAM airlock, based on consumable levels and the crew’s distance from the vehicle.  
Crew locator systems can also be used to pinpoint the location of the EVA crew when they are 
beyond the IVA crew’s line-of-sight.  This provides a valuable safety feature if a crew rescue or 
assistance from a robotic surface rover is required.  Even without line-of-sight communication on 
the lunar surface, such data could be relayed to the IVA crew from Earth, at least for a mission to 
the near side of the Moon.
EVA Tasks
Tasks performed by the crew during the EVAs can be divided into the following five categories:
Setup tasks performed on the first EVA only1.
Setup tasks performed on every EVA2.
EVA surface tasks3.
Cleanup tasks performed on every EVA4.
Cleanup tasks performed on the final EVA only5.
Setup Tasks - First EVA Only:
There are some setup activities required at the beginning of the first EVA to establish an 
infrastructure to support all of the EVAs. These activities include:
External light fixtures and video cameras unstow and deployment - External lighting ·
illuminates areas outside of the LSAM that are visited frequently by the EVA crew, such 
as LSAM ladders (for descending out of the vehicle), suit consumable recharge stations, 
and a rover parking/servicing area. Video cameras on the lunar surface provide the MCC 
the capability to monitor the EVA, as well as for public affairs requirements. 
Rover unstow, deployment, activation and checkout·
EVA tools and equipment unstow·
Setup Tasks - Every EVA:
At the beginning of each EVA, the crew will perform the following setup tasks:
Rover activation - For rover-based EVAs, the crew may need to power up the rover and ·
perform a quick systems check. This is a shorter checkout than the one performed on 
the first EVA.
Science experiment equipment unstow - Packages of the scientific experiments are ·
unstowed from the LSAM and secured to the rover or to the EVA hand carts for transport 
to the worksites.
Equipment necessary for collecting and documenting lunar samples·
EVA Surface Tasks:
The crew ventures away from the LSAM either by walking or via the rover to pre-determined 
locations to conduct their science activities.  These worksites are located with the use of maps 
and electronic navigation equipment that resides on the rover and/or the suits.  Some science 
worksites may not be determined pre-flight, but are selected by the crew and MCC science team, 
based on their observations during the mission.  Some science tasks may involve scouting 
worksites for experiments to be performed on later EVAs or later missions. In addition 
observations of by unmanned robotic pre-cursor missions will drive some of the site selection.
The MCC plays a significant role in managing EVA operations. EVA flight controllers carefully 
monitor spacesuit consumable levels and suit performance. Since the lunar suit life support 
system may not be able to support a complete EVA without a recharge (to minimize the crew’s 
“on-back” weight-carrying load), the MCC has a critical responsibility in managing the EVA 
systems and ensuring the crew does not travel too far from a recharge station. In addition, the 
crew has the ability to view timelines and detailed procedures while performing an EVA via 
printed or electronic checklist.
There will be built in flexibility in the mission timeline should the need arise for real-time 
changes.  An example of a real-time change is when the crew finds a site that is more 
scientifically interesting than those previously planned. In addition, the science community 
supporting on the ground may want to make changes to the timeline, based upon what they 
discover during the mission. Real-time requests from the science community are coordinated 
with the Lunar Surface Operations Officer and EVA Officer consoles in the MCC. For more 
details on the Lunar Surface Operations Officer and EVA Officer consoles, see the 
“Considerations and Challenges” section above.
Having communication with the ground, although highly desired, should not be required to 
continue an EVA. The crew should be free to continue an EVA if communication with the MCC is 
lost due to planned communications outages or unanticipated short communications outages, as 
long as remaining nominal conditions exist. The crew is trained to work completely autonomously 
if communication is lost with MCC, although nominal operations may cease depending on 
reasons for the communication outage.
Lunar exploration EVAs conceivably could have integrated EVA and robotics operations, in order 
to allow for most efficient time usage while crewmembers are out on an EVA. Robotic equipment 
assists crewmembers with scientific experiments and scouting out significant geologic sites. The 
rover itself may become a platform for unmanned robotic exploration after the crew departs the 
surface.
EVA science activities include making observations and compiling a comprehensive survey of 
the local surface geology, including collecting samples of the different geologic characteristics, 
rocks and regolith. Subsurface investigations are also conducted by geophysical profiling, 
drilling, or trenching techniques, and by observing natural depressions in the surface such as 
impact craters or lava channels. Experiment packages are deployed in order to monitor 
geophysical and space physics characteristics of the Moon. One type of experiment package 
would be ISRU (In-Situ Resource Utilization) technology demonstrations include the mining, 
movement, and/or manipulation of the lunar regolith, the chemical processing of the regolith to 
produce useful materials such as oxygen, hydrogen, and metals, and regolith stabilization 
techniques for constructing roads and/or landing pads. 
The EVA crew may also perform technology demonstrations in addition to exploration science 
activities.
Cleanup Tasks - Every EVA:
At the conclusion of each EVA, the crew returns to the LSAM and performs the following cleanup 
tasks:
Rover servicing - Nominally, minor servicing, such as battery recharging, prepares the ·
rover for the next EVA. In a contingency, more significant servicing, such as replacing a 
tire may be needed.
Scientific samples stow - Collection bags and containers of lunar samples collected ·
during the EVA are stowed in the airlocks, and then brought inside the LSAM for 
cataloging and return. Samples will be sealed in such a way as to avoid O2 
contamination and to preclude lunar dust from being introduced into the crew cabin when 
the vehicle regains a zero-g environment in lunar orbit.
Equipment stow - Any small pieces of scientific equipment that collected/recorded data ·
that needs to be brought back to Earth are also stowed in the airlocks. Or equipment that 
has data recorded which may need to be downlinked to MCC for evaluation. The 
scientific data may influence the EVA plan for the rest of the mission.
Suit dust removal - The removal of dust from the suits is a multi-phase operation. First, ·
the crew removes as much dust as possible from their suits, by stomping their boots and 
by using special brushes.  Air hoses or devices utilizing advanced technologies may also 
be provided for dust removal.  A more thorough cleaning of the suits is performed post 
EVA after suit doffing.
Cleanup Tasks - Final EVA Only:
There are some cleanup activities that are only required at the end of the final EVA to conclude 
the lunar surface operations and prepare for return.  These activities include:
Final sample bag and equipment stow - Any sample bags and containers, and scientific ·
equipment that need to return with the crew are stowed.
LSAM inspection and configuration for liftoff - The crew inspects the vehicle and ·
surrounding area to make sure that there is no debris that could interfere with liftoff. 
Items left on the lunar surface that could possibly be of use on later missions, such as 
the rover, need to be moved to a safe distance away from the LSAM, so that they are 
not damaged by the LSAM exhaust plume or blowing dust.
EVA Equipment removal and jettison - To reduce liftoff weight and save propellant, ·
items no longer needed can be discarded on the lunar surface to reduce the LSAM liftoff 
mass. 
Post EVA Operations - Every EVA
After removing as much dust from their suits as possible, the crew ingresses the airlock(s), 
closes the outer hatches, and initiates repressurization. The repressurization may include a hold 
at an intermediate airlock pressure to perform an airlock integrity leak check. 
Once the airlock pressure reaches the LSAM cabin pressure, the crew depressurizes their suits 
and opens their airlock inner hatch. The crew can then doff the suit and other associated EVA 
equipment/garments in order to dress into their “regular” clothes.
Prior to ending their day, the crew performs a thorough cleaning of the outside of the suits. 
Connectors and seals are inspected and cleaned to remove any remaining dust contamination.  
In addition, suit life support consumables are replaced or recharged.  
During crew sleep, MCC will uplink any updates to timelines and detailed procedures for the next 
day’s EVA activities to the LSAM. The ground reviews these changes with the crew prior to them 
being performed the following day.  
LSAM Lunar Ascent Preparations
The crew dons their launch/entry/survival suits prior to LSAM liftoff. All spare components and 
equipment are stowed prior to LSAM liftoff. These items have to be secured for a dynamic flight 
environment with appropriate restraints or stored in dedicated stowage volumes. In addition, 
lunar samples and scientific equipment that will return to Earth with the crew, are stowed and 
secured in a similar fashion.
 CONCLUSIONS
Every lunar mission must also be regarded as a rigorous flight test of the vehicles, equipment, 
procedures, flight rules, and operations concepts.  Lessons learned must be captured and 
applied to later vehicle designs, mission architectures, and operations plans.
The decision to establish a lunar base for long duration missions at a single site would be driven 
by the desire to delve deeper into lunar science and exploration, or by the need for larger scale 
technology testing and more Mars-like experience in planetary surface operations.  
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NEEMO NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations
NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
NOAMA NASA Oceanographic Analog Mission Activity
NURC National Undersea Research Center
NWS National Weather Service
OPS Operations Director
PAO Public Affairs Office
PI Principal Investigator
PMC Private Medical Conference
ROV Remote Operated Vehicle
SIM Scientific Instrument Module
SM Service Module
SMG Spaceflight Meteorology Group
U.K. United Kingdom
UNCW University of North Carolina at Wilmington
U.S. United States of America
